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EUROPEAN ATTITUDES AND INSTITUTIONAL TRUST 
IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AFTER ECONOMIC CRISIS: 
STRESSING THE IMPACT OF THE EUROPEAN IDENTITY
This paper analyses the determinants of people’s support for European institu-
tions, mainly focusing on the impact of European identity, after the economic 
crisis and in a moment in which – after profound uncertainty for its immediate 
future – there is a new feeling toward European integration. Previous research 
on support for European institutions, before the economic and financial cri-
sis which had hit Europe since 2008, found that people’s evaluations followed 
mainly an instrumental logic – support being contingent on a perception of per-
sonal or national benefit accruing for EU membership – with an additional role 
played by European identification. This contribution expands the analysis after 
the beginning of the economic crisis, so to assess whether the former has affect-
ed the structure of such support, and deepens the analysis of the impact of EU 
identity on European institutional confidence. Using a recent Eurobarometer 
survey (86.2, 2016) and combining both individual and contextual data, the 
paper shows that European identity plays a crucial role in explaining European 
support also after the crisis. 
Keywords: European Identity; Trust; Institutions; Eurobarometer; Citizens.
1. Introduction
In March 2017, in a climate of profound uncertainty for its immedi-
ate future, the European Union celebrated its 60th birthday. The «Brexit 
heritage» and the growing size and influence of Europhobic parties, 
together with a legacy of economic and financial crisis, cast a dark light 
on the future of the European Union. Never as in those months have 
the questions about the prospects of a united Europe become compli-
cated. Even the White Paper, handed down by European Commission 
President Jean-Claude Junker, hasn’t tackled the root of the problem. 
A first version of this paper was presented at the 31th annual conference 
of the Italian Political Science Association, University of Urbino, September 
2017, panel Euroscepticism Mainstreamed? Patterns of Euroscepticism in Eu-
rope under Multiple Crises, chair Nicolò Conti. I wish to thank the discussant 
Fedra Negri for her useful comments and all the participants to the discussion. 
Thanks also to the anonymous referees for their very useful comments.
358 Fabio Serricchio
The political events that took place in the following months – especial-
ly the elections in France – have removed the most pressing concerns, 
but there is no doubt that the situation is not yet completely outlined. 
Even the elections in Germany at the end of September 2017 – the other 
political-electoral appointment on which the attention of observers and 
political actors focused on – haven’t allowed the knots to loosen. Thus, 
the future definitely seems to be something to be written, although some 
signs of optimism are beginning to emerge. However, to what extent 
has the economic crisis, after threatening the very existence of Europe, 
altered the structure of relations between citizens and the EU?
The goal of this paper is to inquire into the determinants of peo-
ple’s support for European institutions, also considered as institutional 
confidence, focusing in particular on the attitudinal consequences of 
holding an affective feeling towards Europe that can be labelled as 
European identity. In more detail, the goal is to assess to what extent 
European identity contributes to the explanation of European support 
(in this case, European institutional trust) compared to other determi-
nants. Previous research on such support found that people’s evalua-
tions followed mainly an instrumental logic – support being dependent 
on a perception of personal or national benefits accruing from member-
ship in the European Union (EU) – with an additional role played by 
European identification and other factors, such as trust in Europeans. 
This contribution expands the previous analysis, done well before the 
beginning of the economic crisis, and aims to offer a comprehension of 
the structure of European attitudes.
The paper is organized as follows: in the first section, I discuss 
the concepts of European identity and European institutional trust. 
Subsequently, I review the main theories that have been elaborated to 
explain the development of political support for the EU. Thus, after a 
description of data and measurements, in the second section I offer a de-
scription of distributions of European institutional trust across Europe. 
Finally, I test a model that assesses the explanatory power of European 
identity on EU support as compared to other variables. The concluding 
section reviews the findings and the implications for future research.
2. European Identification and Trust for European Institutions
European identity is often seen in literature as a component of more 
general attitudes towards European integration; in early researches it is 
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even interpreted as being synonymous of support (see Inglehart 1970); 
European identity is also seen as diffuse support of the political com-
munity as a part of the political system (e.g. Duchesne and Frognier 
1995); later research has explicitly interpreted European identity as a 
link to a political community distinct from general support for the EU 
itself (e.g. Scheuer 1999).
According to social identity theory (SIT, Tajfel and Turner 1986), 
identity is a feeling of attachment to a salient group: so European iden-
tity is an attachment to a salient supranational community. Differently 
from a nation, the EU faces difficulties in becoming a proper polity 
because people’s primary loyalty is still weak. Europeans do not share 
a single common history, culture and values. On the other hand, this 
traditional reasoning can be questioned, since Europeans do share a 
relevant past (the Greek polis and the Roman Empire, the Crusades, 
the Renaissance, Romanticism and the French Revolution). However, 
together with a common heritage, Europeans share religious conflicts 
such as the cleavages between Catholics and Protestants, Latin and 
Orthodox, the Christian and Islamic world. Moreover, there are ex-
treme political divisions within Europe: its history is a history of wars, 
culminating in the First and Second World Wars and the Cold War. In 
addition, Europeans do not share a common language. On balance, it 
might therefore be argued that, since basic elements of a common iden-
tity are lacking, the divisions are stronger than the commonalities. This 
perspective sheds a bleak light on the possibility of a European identity.
However, stressing the identity achieved component’s (Huddy 
2001), defining European identity could be easier also because togeth-
er with the vertical dimension (the sense of belonging to), a collec-
tive identity could also imply a horizontal dimension (the so-called 
sense of community, or sense of belonging together, Green 2007; 
Kaina and Karolewski 2013). Another point is stressed by Checkel and 
Katzenstein that contrasts a cosmopolitan vision with a national-popu-
list declination of identity projects (2009, 11). There are few doubts that 
European identity is something closer to a cosmopolitan allegiance, be-
cause it stresses political rights and citizenship, while national-populist 
European identity focuses on cultural authenticity.
Political support could be instrumental and diffuse (see Easton 
1965); this latter is crucial for a political system’s life. In Europe, with 
the end of the initial permissive consensus on EU integration, people’s 
support was conceived as a possible remedy to bridge the gap between 
supranational governance and citizens. Then, in this paper, the basic 
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idea is that European identity might increase the legitimacy of EU go-
vernance, also via a resilience mechanism. 
Public perception of the EU covers several dimensions and litera-
ture suggests a number of typologies to conceptualize them. Moving 
from Easton’s (1965; 1975) notions of specific and diffuse support, 
Norris (1999) distinguishes five objects of political support (political 
community, regime principles, regime processes, regime institutions, 
and political authorities). Conceptually, popular support for the basic 
principles of the EU is conceived as the level of popular approval for 
integration project as whole. But citizens’ orientations towards the EU 
also include evaluations of the institutions of the EU. These assess-
ments of the institutional design of the EU are most commonly assessed 
by asking respondents about their level of trust or confidence in vari-
ous institutions. Institutional trust is explicitly linked to regime stability 
since it enhances the likelihood of support by citizens believing that the 
political system will produce ideal outcomes. 
In Easton’s words, institutional trust could be seen as support for re-
gime institutions; European institutions make decisions so – in a way – 
they are directly considered responsible for policies and answers given. 
During the crisis, European institutions were directly under observation, 
because of lack of responses. For these reasons the focus in this paper 
is on the European institutional trust, as a dependent variable. Before 
exploring the trends and the distribution of European institutional trust 
among countries, the possible source of Europeanism should be con-
sidered. Therefore, the next paragraph will revise the literature on the 
predictors of European attitudes. 
3. Theoretical Perspectives and Research Hypotheses on the Sources of 
European Institutional Trust
The sources of Europeanism are of various nature. In a first step, the 
study of public opinion on European integration drew on the tools and 
methods of the comparative study of regime support at the national lev-
el (Loveless and Rohrschneider 2011, 5). At first, scholars followed the 
model of the permissive consensus (Lindberg and Scheingold 1971). 
Pro-European sentiments began to weaken with the Single European 
Act of 1987 and the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, which 
broadened the sphere of action and the range of competences of the EU 
and brought about its transformation into an unstable system of gover-
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nance. Rejections of the Constitutional Treaty in France and Holland 
in June 2005 – even though for different reasons – and the bumpy road 
taken by the Lisbon Treaty before it became effective in December 
2009, again recall the question of the link between citizens and Europe. 
New theories were proposed and the subsequent empirical research on 
the determinants of European support is quite copious. They point to 
four theoretical perspectives that have been developed over time: cog-
nitive mobilization, instrumental rational perspectives, political mobili-
zation and affective and identitarian explanations (Bellucci et al. 2012; 
Toka et al. 2012).
Chronologically, the first theoretical perspective used to explain at-
titudes to Europe was the cognitive mobilization theory advanced by 
Inglehart (1970). This was followed by a series of studies in which mo-
tivations of a utilitarian nature had a predominant role (Gabel 1998). 
Subsequently, a number of authors studied Europeanism according to 
the idea that political explanations offered the key to its understanding 
(Anderson 1998; Sanchez-Cuenca 2000). More recently, the identity 
paradigm has been established, where national (and local) identities 
are seen as the variables explaining most of the variation of the ori-
entations of public opinion towards Europe (Carey 2002; Hooghe and 
Marks 2005; McLaren 2002). Summing up, the possible predictors of 
pro-Europeanism could be placed into two broad categories: economic 
and non-economic, as suggested by Hooghe and Marks (2005). 
The economic-utilitarian theory (Gabel, 1998), interprets the 
pro-European sentiments of public opinion as the product of rational 
thinking and therefore of a calculation. Membership of Europe is in 
other words evaluated on the basis of criteria of expedience and utility 
of the choice involved. This literature presupposes that citizens are ca-
pable of rational evaluation, and therefore of calculating the economic 
consequences of European integration both for themselves and for the 
social groups to which they belong, including the nation. Attitudes to-
wards the EU are thus the product of this calculation. The results of 
Gabel’s investigations showed that citizens that benefitted directly from 
community assistance (such as farmers) had a higher level of support 
for Europe: this is a reflection of the so-called egocentric utilitarianism. 
The utilitarian approach also takes into account aggregate economic 
factors, according to economic voting literature (Lewis-Beck 1988). 
From this perspective, support for European integration is influenced 
by the performance of the national economic system. In particular, sup-
port for integration is strong when the state of the national economy (in 
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terms of inflation, unemployment and growth) is good (Eichenberg and 
Dalton 1993): this is the so-called sociotropic utilitarianism. In sum, 
the central assumption of the economic or instrumental theory is that 
individuals’ orientations towards the EU result from a calculation of 
costs and benefits.
In very recent years, economic crisis played a crucial role in 
Europeanism, as several studies show (see Serricchio et al. 2013). 
This perspective in particular is useful because the economic crisis 
has threatened the very existence of the European Union. Kuhn and 
Stoeckel (2014) look at the effects of the crisis on support for European 
economic governance. As far as the utilitarian approach is concerned, 
the authors hypothesize an opposite relationship with support for EU 
governance during the crisis. Lastly, Di Mauro and Serricchio (2016) 
assess the role of national institutions as proxy for Europeanism, stress-
ing also the role of some contextual variables. 
Among non-economic factors, cognitive mobilization (based on 
growth in levels of education among citizens, exposure to a wider range 
of information sources and consequently greater awareness of Europe 
and of the way it works) was thought to favour pro-European senti-
ments. However, in recent years, especially following the expansion 
in the range of competences of the EU and its various enlargements, 
the identity explanation has become more relevant. In this perspective, 
national identity becomes a key predictor of the orientations of public 
opinion with respect to the EU. In Carey’s view (2002), the danger of 
a loss of power on the part of the citizen’s own member state deriving 
from the growing interference of the supranational institutions produc-
es a negative reaction in those citizens who do not see the EU as a le-
gitimate entity, and who in any case do not see or clearly recognize the 
outline of a European identity. So, for Carey, strong national identities, 
in some cases reinforced by sentiments of belonging to a subnational 
territory, constitute an obstacle to European integration. 
McLaren (2002) focuses on the perception of a threat to one’s own 
identity. The perceived threat posed by integration with other popu-
lations and cultures could be economic, deriving from possible con-
flicts over economic benefits enjoyed by minority groups, or it could 
derive from purely cultural considerations. The conclusion reached by 
McLaren is in line with that of Carey: strong national identities obstruct 
the process of European integration. However, the relationship between 
national identity and attitudes towards Europe seems to be more com-
plex. For Duchesne and Frognier (1995), Bruter (2005) and Citrin and 
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Sides (2004), in contrast to the interpretations of Carey and McLaren, 
the relationship between a sense of national belonging and pro-Europe-
an sentiments is rather positive, and a strong national identity is fully 
compatible with positive attitudes towards Europe. Similar conclusions 
are reached by the authors of studies carried out by social psychologists 
(Catellani and Milesi 1998; Cinnirella 1997; Huici et al. 1997). 
Hooge and Marks (2005) have suggested that the national context 
has a mediating role: national identity works in opposite directions, 
in favour of or against European integration, according to the context 
concerned, and especially as a consequence of specific political events 
with the power to trigger nationalistic sentiments in citizens (in the case 
in point, the holding of a referendum on Europe). Accordingly, people 
holding exclusive national identity – in contrast to people expressing 
dual allegiance to both nation and Europe – would be less supportive 
of European integration. Other authors (Bellucci et al. 2012; Serricchio 
2010 for the Italian case) stress the impact of different component 
of national identity (civic vs ethnic or, as social psychologists claim, 
achieved vs ascribed, see Huddy 2001). The role of European identity 
in determining pro-European attitudes is quite clear.  In the Intune proj-
ect (e.g., Serricchio 2011; Sanders et al. 2012) European identity has a 
relevant role as a predictor in European attitudes and, in fact, according 
to Toka et al. (2012), European identity can be grouped into an affective 
and identitarian factor. According to Serricchio and Bellucci (2016), 
European identification is one of the most powerful predictor of pro-Eu-
ropean attitudes also because could be seen as source of resilience. 
The third perspective introduces political mobilization factors and 
judgemental heuristics. The main idea here is that mass perceptions of 
Europe are defined in national political arenas and that parties, political 
elites and the mass media may cue voters in their views towards Europe 
and its institutions (Hooghe and Marks 2005). Political explanations (or 
political cues) encompass theoretical perspectives whose wide range is 
reflected in a corresponding heterogeneity of empirical findings. One 
perspective emphasizes the way in which individuals use certain politi-
cal cues – which come to them from their own ideological orientations 
and the messages put in circulation by the political elites – to form their 
ideas about Europe. Underlying this approach is the conviction that in-
dividuals are not able to obtain complete information; that their capaci-
ty for rational thinking is limited; that they have only partial awareness 
of the relevant issues and therefore must make use of institutional and 
other forms of delegation. These studies therefore give special empha-
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sis to the role of political parties as the suppliers of cognitive shortcuts 
(Gabel 1998). 
A second perspective focuses on citizens’ confidence in national in-
stitutions and in the national political system more generally. Anderson 
(1998) shows that the attitudes of citizens towards the EU – which is 
now a polity for all practical purposes, a polity sui generis though it 
may be – are to a degree filtered by the national political and institu-
tional system. In other words, confidence in institutions has a positive 
impact on citizens’ attitudes to Europe because the national institutions 
are used as cognitive shortcuts. Those who have confidence in their 
own political system are likely to develop attitudes of closeness to, if 
not confidence in, the institutions of Europe. However, the impact can 
also be negative, as Sanchez-Cuenca (2000) shows: those mistrustful 
of the national political system may develop strongly pro-European 
attitudes. So on the one hand, Anderson (1998) establishes a mecha-
nism of institutional proxy in the context of which the national insti-
tutions are shortcuts to feelings of confidence in Europe. On the other 
hand, Sanchez-Cuenca (2000) provides confirmation of the hypothesis 
of a substitution mechanism whereby a lack of confidence in the na-
tional political system leads to the prediction of strong pro-European 
sentiments. Bellucci et al. (2012) show that the relationship between 
confidence in the national institutions and pro-European attitudes is in 
fact mediated by a third variable, namely, the quality of governance. In 
countries where this is high, the relationship is negative.
Based on this literature review, two hypotheses to be tested can be 
drawn: the first (H1) is that European identity increases European insti-
tutional trust (Serricchio and Bellucci 2016); the second (H2) assumes 
that context differentiates the role of some relevant factors: thus, nation-
al institutional confidence is positively correlated with European insti-
tutional trust when the quality of national governance is low (Bellucci 
et al. 2012).
4. Data and Measurement 
In order to conduct the analysis and test the two hypothesis, I use 
a very recent Eurobarometer survey, the 86.2, which was released in 
November 2016 by the European Commission. Together with indi-
vidual level data, contextual data are employed: these are taken from 
Eurostat (GDP,  growth and unemployment rate) and also provided by 
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Transparency International (the corruption perception index, CPI). In 
the following analysis, the dependent variable is the European insti-
tutional confidence, an index that combines some classic measures of 
European institutional trust, including both elected and not elected in-
stitutions: so, the scale includes general European trust, trust towards 
Parliament, European Commission, European Central Bank and a mea-
sure of satisfaction on how European democracy works; the variables 
were combined into an additive index and rescaled into a 0-10 point 
range, where 0 is the lowest level of confidence and 10 the highest.
Usually, European identity is measured with survey instruments 
pertinent to belonging, territorial-geographical attachment and future 
feelings (Citrin and Sides 2004; Moreno 2006; Sinnott 2006). In pre-
vious research (Serricchio and Bellucci 2016), European identity is 
conceptualized and measured according to social identity theory, that 
imply belonging and salience, captured by two questions which have 
been elaborated from Lilli and Diehl’s (1999) as reformulation of 
the collective self-esteem scale originally proposed by Luhtanen and 
Crocker (1992); unfortunately, the Eurobarometer survey employed for 
this paper doesn’t have the same items nor any similar. Nevertheless, it 
contains several parameters that measure emotional and affective feel-
ing toward Europe thus allowing to well grasp the feeling of European 
identification.
The questions included are: Europe perceived image, the European 
and the European Union attachment, the European citizenship and the 
classic measure of European identity, the so called Moreno question; 
the variables were combined into an additive index and rescaled into 
a 0-10 point range, where 0 is the lowest level of identification and 10 
the highest.
5. European Attitudes Across Time: A Return of Europeanism?
The 2016 survey reveals an innovation: a significant revival of 
Europeanism. The (small) tendencies of some selected indicators – 
some of them are shown in figure 1 – describe a growing trend: from 
2013, positive EU image gains five points, EU attachment four (going 
back to 2007 levels), trust toward European Parliament increases by 
four points; exclusive national identity (that is, according to literature 
– a measure of opposition to European identity and Europe in gener-
al) decreases by five points; the remaining indicators reveal a minor 
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growth. In general, the pre-crisis level has not yet been achieved (ex-
cept for EU attachment), but the increase is evident. These trends need 
to be confirmed in the following months. Therefore, next survey most 
probably will tell us something more on this subject. However, the re-
sults are quite clear.
Focusing on the described dependent variable, it has a moderate 
average intensity (4.9 on a 0-10 scale, N=27,405) with a 3.2 of stan-
dard deviation, that reveals a good variability among nations; so, as 
suspected, this new enthusiasm is not common to all Europeans; in-
deed, the level of European institutional trust varies considerably across 
European nations, depending on national context, with sixteen coun-
tries over the average. Therefore, a question could be raised: which 
factors explain this great variations among different national contexts? 
A preliminary explanation recalls the different impact of economic and 
financial crisis, the different level of national attachment but also – and 
possibly most importantly – the potential different role of national insti-
tutional confidence, also taking into account the already mentioned dif-
ferent levels of quality of governance. A more complex explanation is 
thus needed. In order to do so, some multivariate regression models are 
set up. In these models the dependent variable is always the European 
institutional confidence, measured as explained; the predictors are se-
Fig. 1. Europeanism across time (selected indicators).
Source: author’s elaboration based on Eurobarometer 67.2 (2007), 80.1 (2013) 
and  86.2 (2016).
          2007   2013      2016
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lected and included according to the theories presented and discussed in 
section 3. The next sections will present and discuss empirical findings. 
This also allows me to explain the relevance of European identity. 
6. Determinants of European Institutional Confidence 
The literature review has shown that several factors affect the level 
of pro-EU attitudes and may lead to changes over the years and between 
countries. To ascertain their impact I start with a basic regression model 
(OLS) with only individual level predictors: this is model 1 presented in 
table 1. The sociodemographic variables are included mainly as control 
variables, without any specific hypotheses. The coefficients at the indi-
vidual level suggest that economic variables are associated with great 
strength of support, also after the crisis. So, it is confirmed that the eco-
nomy does directly impact the EU support. Observing the confidence in 
national institutions, this predictor is very strongly correlated with the 
index of EU institutional trust, with a positive direction. This is a very 
relevant finding, as the role of domestic governance is not always uni-
vocal and sometimes uncertain, as explained. With these data and this 
analysis its role appears to be quite clear: national identity has a weak 
Fig. 2. Mean level of European institutional trust (0-10 scale), by country 
(2016).
Source: author’s elaboration based on Eurobarometer 86.2 (2016).
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impact, although positive. In general the model fit the data reasonably 
well as r-square reveals (.31). 
In the second model (model 2 in table 1) I add European identity: 
this has one relevant impact on general explanation, as r-square incre-
ases from .31 to .44. Moreover, the impact of European identity on 
European institutional confidence is very relevant (coefficient is .55). 
The other predictors keep more or less the same effect, without relevant 
exceptions. In the third model (model 3 in table 1) there is a further 
step ahead, because contextual predictors are included in the regres-
sion model: so the quality of governance, measured by the corruption 
perception index1, unemployment rate and GDP growth2 are incorpo-
rated in order to test the effect of context on individual perception of 
European institutions; next to individual and aggregate level predictors, 
I add two micro-macro interaction terms: one is between national in-
stitutional confidence and the corruption perception index in order to 
assess whether (and in which way) the measured quality of governance 
interacts with popular perception of the performance of domestic insti-
tutions; the second one is between European identity and GDP growth; 
the reason why I include this interaction is to test if a sense of European 
attachment and national economy could be linked in citizens’ mind. So, 
indirectly, this interaction could be useful to test the hypothesis that 
European identity could have served as reserve of resilience in times of 
crisis. Therefore, there are micro-macro interactions3. 
In model 3 we can observe some relevant findings: first of all, eco-
nomic contextual variables have no impact: unemployment and GDP 
growth are statistically not significant. So, while economic individual 
perception has a quite relevant role (mainly the questions that refer 
to actual economy in Europe and expectation in European economy), 
the economical contextual variables have an uncertain impact. Why? 
Probably because whereas indicators suggests that crisis is now over-
come, citizens still perceive the negative effect and believe that the 
European institutions in economic governance are responsible at least 
1 A higher level of CPI reveals a less corrupted nation.
2 CPI is provided by Trasparency International; GDP growth and unemploy-
ment rate come from Eurostat. For a better interpretation of results I coded as 
binary the contextual variables (1: low level; 2: high level). Fo the same reasons 
I have coded as binary the national institutional trust variable. 
3 The model has standard error corrected for cluster (nations). This model is 
similar to a multilevel model. I also run a classic multilevel model with random 
effect that gives substantially the same results. This model is not shown but 
available upon request from the author.
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 1 2 3
National economy -0.05***(0.02) -0.12***(0.02) -0.08(0.06)
European economy 0.80***(0.02) 0.60***(0.02) 0.57***(0.05)
Economic expectation 0.07***(0.03) 0.06**(0.02) 0.04(0.04)
Economic expectation (european) 0.40***(0.02) 0.22***(0.02) 0.21***(0.02)
Media use index 0.20***(0.02) -0.01(0.02) 0.02(0.03)
National institutional confidence 2.40***(0.04) 1.88***(0.04) 1.39***(0.33)
European identity  0.55***(0.01) 0.57***(0.02)
National identity 0.07***(0.01) -0.031***(0.01) -0.03(0.02)
Left-right scale 0.006(0.03) -0.02(0.03) 0.01(0.06)
Left-right scale squared 0.002(0.003) 0.01**(0.00) 0.00 (0.01)
Sex -0.16***(0.04) -0.19***(0.03) -0.20***(0.03)
Education 0.16***(0.02) 0.01(0.02) -0.00(0.03)
Age -0.17***(0.02) -0.09***(0.02) -0.08**(0.03)
Occupation (unemployment) 0.30***(0.09) 0.02(0.08) 0.03(0.03)
Contextual variables 
Unemployment rate   -0.03(0.11)
GDP growth   0.05(0.22)
CPI   0.30*(0.17)
Interaction
Interaction CPI*National 
institutional confidence   -0.43**(0.19)
Interaction European identity*
GDP growth   0.36*(0.19)
   -0.19***(0.06)
Constant -0.36**(0.18) -0.230(0.165) -0.49(0.54)
Observations 22.513 22.513 21.877
R-squared 0.31 0.44 0.44
Number of clusters (nation)   28
Tab. 1. European identity as predictor of European institutional confidence. 
Individual and contextual determinants (2016) 
Source: author’s elaboration based on Eurobarometer 86.2 (2016).
Note: Standar errors in parentheses: ***: p<0.01, **: p<0.05, *: p<0.1.
Model 1 and 2 are OLS regression. Model 3 is linear regression with standard 
error corrected for 28 clusters (nation).
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as national governments are. CPI, that measures quality of governance, 
is negative and the magnitude effect is relevant (-.44). Since a high 
value of CPI means a low level of corruption, the less corrupted na-
tions strongly support the European institutions. The positive sign of 
interaction means that popular perception of quality of governance and 
objective measurement goes in the same direction: in other words, citi-
zens in less corrupted countries (that are those in which quality of go-
vernance in higher) are more prompt to transfer allegiance to a suprana-
tional polity due to a higher level of confidence in national institutions.
The second interaction is between European identity and GDP 
growth: the direction is positive, the magnitude is high and the relation 
is statistically significant. What does it means? In essence, it means that 
the perception of being part of a supranational community has actual-
ly mitigated the effects of the economic crisis, measured as change in 
GDP level. Therefore, the hypothesis 1 (H1) in actual facts is largely 
confirmed: the sense of European identification greatly increases the 
confidence in European public institutions. This confirms the idea 
that European institutions and the project of European integration are 
somewhat linked in the mind of citizens: in other words there are no 
dramatic differentiations between Europe as geographic and historical 
concept and European Union as project of integration of the whole of 
Europe. Concerning the hypothesis 2 (H2) there are two basic relevant 
findings: first of all the role of the context is confirmed as prominent; 
then, the public perception of national governance performances is ef-
fectively conditioned from the level of «objective» quality of governan-
ce and this confirm previous research on this topic. 
7. Conclusion
In the first months of 2017 European Union was highly contest-
ed: in March 2017, the united Europe celebrated its 60th birthday in a 
very heavy climate (remembering Brexit and the growing influence of 
Eurosceptic parties across Europe) nor the White Paper, handed down 
by European Commission President Jean-Claude Junker, seem to indi-
cate useful solutions. The presidential and parliamentary elections in 
France seem to have removed the most pressing concerns, but the pic-
ture is not yet completely outlined and the future of a United Europe is 
still under observation. What will be the future is a very hard question 
but some signs of optimism are beginning to emerge. So, in this general 
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climate, this paper aimed to assess if the economic crisis altered the 
structure of relations between citizens and the EU. 
Previous research on support for European integration found that 
citizens’ evaluation followed mainly an instrumental logic – support be-
ing contingent on a perception of personal or national benefit accruing 
for EU membership – with an additional role played by European iden-
tity. This contribution expanded the analysis already done, mainly when 
the financial and economic crisis began to affect popular confidence 
towards political institutions and, mainly, the supranational polity. The 
findings are quite surprising. First of all, pro-European attitudes show 
an increasing level, although level of trust in European institutions (and 
other indicators too) considerably varies across countries. 
The first result to highlight concerns the role of European identity 
that is able to contribute significantly to the explanation of the support. 
Probably this affective attachment constitutes a reserve of resilience, 
able to drive public perception toward Europe across times of crisis, al-
lowing to maintain support at an acceptable level during peaks of disaf-
fection too. This could be good news for the future of the united Europe 
and an indication for political actors. The second relevant finding con-
cerns the trust in national political institutions and the impact of the 
quality of governance. National institutional confidence appears always 
positive in all models, although the magnitude decrease when European 
identity and aggregate variables enter the models (2 e 3). So, if in previ-
ous research (Serricchio e Bellucci, 2016) the two factors seem to work 
only if combined, it now appears this is not necessarily the case. 
Further researches should focus firstly on the level of pro-European 
attitudes, seeking confirmation of their increasing levels. In addiction, 
and most importantly, all the possible interaction between context and 
individual attitudes are yet to be verified because according to these 
results the question is only partially solved.  
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